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ABSTRACT
It is expect that mobile agents technology will bring significant benefits to electronic commerce. But security issues,
especially threats from malicious hosts, become a great obstacle of widespread deployment of applications in electronic
commerce based on mobile agents technology. Undetachable digital signature is a category of digital signatures to
secure mobile agents against malicious hosts. An undetachable signature scheme by using encrypted functions from
bilinear pairings was proposed in this paper. The security of this scheme base on the computational intractability of
discrete logarithm problem and computational Diffe-Hellman problem on gap Diffle-Hellman group. Furthermore, the
scheme satisfies all the requirements of a strong non-designated proxy signature i.e. verifiability, strong unforgeability,
strong identifiability, strong undeniability and preventions of misuse. An undetachable threshold signature scheme that
enable the customer to provide n mobile agents with ‘shares’ of the undetachable signature function is also provided. It
is able to provide more reliability than classical undetachable signatures.
Keywords: electronic commerce, mobile agents, undetachable digital signatures, bilinear pairings
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile agents technology are attracting a great deal of
interest from both industry and academia since middle
of 1990’s. Compared with traditional computing models,
e.g. client/server, mobile agents technology has
following advantages[1][2][3]:.
z Autonomous mobile agents strive to achieve a
given goal without permanent observation by
its owner. As a matter of consequence, the
user is free to take care of other tasks, saving
time in the process.
z If a host is being shut down, all mobile agents
executing on that machine are warned and
given time to dispatch and continue their
operation on another host in the network.
z Users may dispatch mobile agents over a
temporary network connection to a target
network. After dispatching, the temporary
network link may be brought down until a
later point in time.
Mobile agents technique brings significant benefits to
electronic commerce because of these advantages. But
on the other hand, there are also some problems. The
most important one is security.
Threats to the security of mobile agents generally fall
into four comprehensive classes[4]:
z Agent against agent platform
z Agent platform against agent
z Agent against other agents
z Other entities against agent system
Hohl[5] identified the following attacks: spying out
code; spying out data; spying out control flow;
manipulation of code; manipulation of data;

manipulation of control flow;. incorrect execution of
code; masquerading of the host; denial of execution;
spying out interaction with other agents; manipulation
of interaction with other agents; returning wrong results
of system calls issued by the agent.
Thus, security issues, especially threatens from
potentially malicious hosts become a great obstacle of
widespread deployment of applications in electronic
commerce based on mobile agents technique.
2. PREVIOUS WORKS ABOUT UNDETACHABLE
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
2.1 The preliminary idea
Before 1998, many researchers believed that, on
malicious hosts, mobile agents were impossible to
prevent tampering unless trusted and tamper-resistant
hardware is available. Follow points[6] are considered
by them:
z Cleartext data can be read and changed.
z Cleartext programs can be manipulated.
z Cleartext messages can be faked.
But Sander and Tschudin[7] pointed out that this belief
is incorrect because mobile agents do not have to be
executed in cleartext form. They proposed the idea of
undetachable digital signatures that allows a mobile
agent to effectively produce a digital signature inside a
remote and possibly malicious host without the host
being able to deduce the agent’s secret or to reuse the
signature routine for arbitrary documents. Here is a brief
introduction of the idea.
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Sig be a rational function used by C (a
customer) to produce the digital signature Sig (m) of
an arbitrary message m . Furthermore suppose the
message m is the result of a rational function f
applied to some input data x . Finally the verification
function Ver that C publishes in order to let others
check the validity of the digital signature z is
regarded to be a valid signature of m if and only if:
z = Sig (m)
(1)
Let

For letting the customer’s mobile agent create
“undetachable” signatures, he computes:
f Signed = Sig o f
(2)
Then he sends

order is a prime q , and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative
group of the same order q : The discrete logarithm
problems in both

m = f ( x)
(3)
z = f Signed (x)
(4)
Though the signature function, Sig , is not known by
others, every one can verify the validity of a message
m by testing:
?

Ver ( z ) = m

(5)

2.2 The first implementation
Although Sander and Tschudin tried to give a outline of
undetachable digital signatures by using birational
functions based on Shamir’s work[8]. Unfortunately no
secure undetachable digital signatures scheme has been
proposed until 2000. In 2000 Kotzanikolaou, Burmester
and
Chrissikopoulos
presented
an
RSA
implementation[9] of undetachable digital signatures.
But this scheme does not provide server’s
non-repudiation because it does not contain server’s
signature[10].

conditions:
z Bilinear: (6) and (7) or (8)

z

e(P1 + P2 ,Q) = e(P1 ,Q)e(P2 ,Q)
e(P,Q1 + Q2 ) = e(P,Q1 )e(P,Q2 )

(7)

e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)

(8)

signatures

and

Q ∈ G1 subject to (9).
e(P,Q) ≠ 1

z

(9)
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm
to compute e(P,Q) for all {P, Q} ⊆ G1

We note that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with
supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be
modified to create such bilinear maps. Suppose that G is
an additive group. Four mathematical problems is
defined as follow [14][15].
z Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP):
Given two group elements P and Q ,
and an integer n , such that (10) is satisfied
whenever such an integer exists.
Q = nP
(10)
z Decision Diffle-Hellman Problem (DDHP):
For {a, b, c} ⊆ Z q , given P, aP, bP, cP
*

decide whether:

c ≡ ab(mod q)

z

other

In 2001 Lee, Kim and Kim provided an RSA based
construction of undetachable digital signatures called
"Strong Non-designated Proxy Signature" [10]. Their
scheme enhanced [9] and often be acronymized as
"LKK-SPS" scheme. A scheme of undetachable
threshold signature[13] was proposed by Borselius,
Mitchell and Wilson in the same year. In 2002, a strong
proxy signature scheme with proxy signer privacy
protection[11] was given and a pragmatic alternative to
undetachable signatures[12] was also proposed.
3. BILINEAR PAIRINGS AND SIGNATURE
SCHEMES BASED ON THEM
3.1 Mathematical preliminaries of Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 be a cyclic group generated by P , whose

ab

(6)

Non-degenerate: There exists P ∈ G1 and

Computational
(CDHP):
For

2.3
Strong
proxy
implementations

G1 and G 2 are hard. Let

e : G1 × G1 → G 2 be a pairing satisfies the following

f Signed and f to S (a shop) with his

mobile agent. S evaluates:
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z

Diffe-Hellman

{a, b} ⊆ Z q*

(11)
Problem

P, aP, bP

compute abP
Gap Diffle-Hellman Problem (GDHP):
A class of problems where DDHP is
easy while CDHP is hard.

We assume through this paper that CDHP and DLP are
intractable, which means there is no polynomial time
algorithm to solve CDHP or DLP with non-negligible
probability. When the DDHP is easy but the CDHP is
hard on the group G1 , G1 is called a Gap
Diffle-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be
found on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic
curves over finite fields, and the bilinear parings can be
derived
from
the
Weil
or
Tate
pairing
e : G1 × G1 → G 2 . Our schemes of this paper can be
built on any GDH group. More mathematical
background can be found in [14][16][17][18]. Now,
some system parameters should be defined for Sec. 4 as
following: Let P be a generator of G1 , the bilinear
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paring is e : G1 × G1 → G 2 . Moreover, to hash

z

Let s S be the signature key of S .

functions are given here: H 1 : {0,1} → Z q

z

Let PU S be the verification key of S

*

and

H 2 : {0,1} → G1 . The implementation of these hash

where:

*

functions can be referred to works such as [25]. But the
choice of conventional hash functions should be very
carefully because many hash functions were cracked
recently [26].

PU S = s S P
z

Let bid _ S be the bid information of S .

z

Let TS be the timestamp of

z
3.2 A Survey of Signature Schemes Based on Bilinear
Pairings
In recent years, variety schemes of digital signatures
have been proposed. For threshold signatures,
Boldyreva[15] proposed a robust proactive threshold
signature scheme, a multi-signature scheme and a blind
signature scheme which work in any Gap Diffie
Hellman group in 2002. Then Vo, Zhang and Kim[19]
presented a new threshold blind digital signature based
on pairings without the third party. For Mutilsignatures,
Lin, Wu and Zhang[20] proposed a new structured
multi-signature scheme from the Gap Diffie-Hellman
Group that considers the signing order among
co-signers. Boneh, Boyen and Shacham[21] constructed
a short group signature scheme based on the Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption. Nguyen[22] proposed a
group signature scheme with constant-size parameters
that does not require any trapdoor secret, thereby, allows
sharing of public parameters among organizations. As to
Blind signature, Chow et al.[23] gave an unlinkable
partially blind signature scheme and an ID-based
unlinkable
partially
blind
signature
scheme.
Furthermore, Zhang et al.[24] addressed that it was easy
to design proxy signature and proxy blind signature
from the conventional ID-based signature schemes
using bilinear pairings and gave some concrete schemes
based on existed ID-based signature schemes.

Let

ϕ : G1 → {0,1}

*

bid _ S .

be a function

mapping a point of G1 into a binary string.
4.2 Security scheme
The Customer does following operations：
z Computes:

H C = H 2 (C || req _ C || TC )

(14)

z

Computes:

z

K C = sC ⋅ H C
(15)
Gives (C || req _ C || TC ) to the Agent.

z

Gives to the Agent as part of its executable
code the undetachable signature function pair:
f (⋅) = (⋅) H C
(16)
and

f Signed (⋅) = (⋅) K C

(17)

Sig ( x) = sC (⋅)

(18)

Suppose：
It turns out the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The functions above construct an
undetachable digital signature scheme.
Proof.

( Sig o f )(⋅)

= Sig ( f (⋅))

4. UNDETACHABLE SIGNATURES BASED ON
BILINEAR PAIRINGS

= Sig ((⋅) H C )
= s C ((⋅) H C )

4.1 Settings

(19)

= (⋅) s C H C
= (⋅) K C

Assume that all participants have the common system
parameters: (G1 , G2 , e, q, P, H 1 , H 2 ) .
Settings about the customer：
z Let C be an identifier for the Customer.
z Let sC be the signature key of C .
z

(13)

Let PU C be the verification key of C
where:

z

PU C = sC P
(12)
Let req _ C be the constraints of the

z

Customer.
Let TC be the timestamp of

req _ C .

Settings about shops：
z Let S be an identifier for a shop.

= f Signed (⋅)
After the Agent migrated to the host of S ，the validity
of the mobile agent should be verified first by checking:

e(K C , P ) = e(H C , PU C )
(20)
If it is a valid signature of C , then S does following
?

operations：
z Computes:

H S = H 2 (C || req _ C || TC || S || bid _ S || TS )
(21)

z

Computes:

Y = sS H S

(22)
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z
z
z

Computes:

x = H 1 (ϕ (Y ) )

(23)

z = f Signed ( x)

(24)

Computes:
Gives ( x, z , Y , H S , S , bid _ S , TS ) to the
mobile agent.

After the mobile agent goes back to C . The
correctness of (21) and (23) should be verified first.
Then the verification should be performed by formula
(25):

e(Y , P ) = e(H S , PU S )
?

(25)

The notion of undetachable threshold signatures was
introduced in [27]. An undetachable threshold signature
scheme will enable the customer, C , to provide n
mobile agents with ‘shares’ of the signature key (where
the shares will be a function of req _ C and TC ).
For more details about undetachable threshold signature
such as their usage and application can be found in [27].
5.2 Security Scheme
Based on undetachable signature scheme proposed in
section 4, a variety of secret sharing scheme can be used
to construct undetachable threshold signatures by
converting sC into signature shares. An example using
Lagrange Polynomial Interpolation is given here:

4.3 Security Analysis

Suppose f

The following proposition can be obtained because G1
is a GDH group.
Proposition 2. A transaction is valid if and only if
(20), (21), (23) and (25) are true.
Proof. If the mobile Agent is not detached before it
migrated to the host of S , then:

e( K C , P )

= e( H C , P ) C
s

is a polynomial over Z q with degree

t − 1 subject to (28).

sC = f (0)
performed over Z q .
Let:

si = f (i ), i = 1,2, L n

⎛
⎜
t ⎜
sC = ∑ ⎜ si j
j =1 ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝

(26)

= e(H C , PU C )
If an opponent Oscar want to modify C ’s bid
information when C ’s agent mobiles to his host, he
has to construct a new undetachable digital signature
pair (H C , K C ) of the Customer which will include
modified constraints req _ C ' of the Customer. But
this needs to solve the computational difficult problems
mentions in section 3.1.

sC by

⎞
⎟
ih ⎟
∏
h =1
⎟
t
(ih − i j )⎟⎟
∏
h =1
⎟
h≠ j
⎠

sC = ∑ (s j l j )
Where:
t

= e(s S H S , P )

= e(H S , PU S )

∏h
h =1

t

∏ (h − j )

(32)

h =1
h≠ j

Then C does following extra operations
z Computes:

PCi = si P, i = 1, L , n

Similar to equation (20), the security of (23) and (25)
also relies upon the difficulty of the problems
computational infeasible to solve at present.
5. UNDETACHABLE THRESHOLD SIGNATURES

(31)

j =1

lj =

= e( H S , s S P )

(30)

t

e(Y , P )

(27)

t

To simplify the description we suppose the t shares are
s1 ,L, st , thus:

Furthermore, if a transaction is valid:

5.1 Basic Idea

(29)

calculating (30)

= e( H C , s C P )

sS

(28)

Operations in equations (29) to (32) and (38) are

Then any one has t shares can obtain

= e(s C H C , P )

= e( H S , P )
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(33)

and (34) instead of (14).

H C = H 2 (C || req _ C || TC ||
PC1 || L || PCn )

z

(34)

Computes:

K i = si ⋅ H C , i = 1, L , n

(35)
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After the i-th Agent migrated to the host of S ，the
validity of the mobile agent should be verified first the
by checking:

a ‘signature share’. Second, The ‘correctness’ of a
signature share can be verified independently of any
other signature shares. Third, any shop, when equipped
with t different signature shares restricted with the
same request of C for the same message M , can
construct a signature on M which will be verifiable
by any party with a trusted copy of public key of C ,
and which will also enable the corresponding req _ C

e(K i , P ) = e(H i , PCi )

(37)

and TC to be verified. Finally, knowledge of less than

It is clear that a shop has t or more than t shares can
reconstruct f Signed by (38). But anyone cannot

t different signature shares for the same message
M cannot be used to construct a valid signature one the
message M , knowledge of any number of different

z

Gives PC1 || L || PC n to these n agents.

Finally, C gives (36) to the i-th agent as part of its
executable code instead of (17):
f Signed ,i (⋅) = (⋅) K i
(36)

?

reconstruct f Signed from less than t shares.
t

[

f Signed (⋅) = ∑ li f Signed ,i (⋅)

]

(38)

i =1

After a shop has reconstruct f Signed successfully, other
operations are similar to undetachable signatures
proposed in section 4. So redundant words are omitted.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel implementation
of undetachable digital signatures and a correspondent
security scheme. Compared to [9][10], our scheme uses
a different cryptosystem to construct undetachable
signatures. This implementation of undetachable digital
signatures is based on non-interactive CEF (Computing
with Encrypted Functions) from bilinear pairings to
protect the original signature function Sig by
encrypting it with a function

f

to obtain the

encrypted function f Signed defined as the composition
of Sig and f . Furthermore, the scheme satisfies all
the five requirements of a strong non-designated proxy
signature proposed by Lee et al. in [10] as follow: First,
verifiability: A proxy signer can create a valid proxy
signature for the original signer. But the original signer
and any third party cannot create a valid proxy signature
with the name of proxy signer, Second, strong
unforgeability: Anyone can determine the identity of the
corresponding proxy signer form a proxy signature.
Third, strong identifiability: Once a proxy signer creates
a valid proxy signature on behalf of an original signer,
the proxy signer cannot repudiate his signature creation
against anyone. Fourth, strong undeniability: It should
be confident that proxy key pair cannot be used for
other purpose. In the case of misuse, the responsibility
of proxy signer should be determined explicitly. Finally,
preventions of misuse: From a proxy signature a verifier
can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on
the signed message.
As to the undetachable threshold signature scheme
proposed in the paper, it has following features: First,
each agent can use their share to sign a message M ,
e.g. a piece of bid information, of their choice to obtain

signature shares for messages other than the message
M will not enable the construction of a valid signature
on M and knowledge of any number of different
signature shares for request other than req _ C or
with a different time stamp will not enable the
construction of a valid signature with associated
req _ C and TC . So our scheme satisfied all the
requirements of undetachable threshold signatures
defined in [27] and provide more reliability than
classical undetachable signatures.
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